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ABSTRACT 
The Norwegian public transport market has experienced a significant development over the last 
decade. Over this period the number of independent companies have declined from 220 to 83, the two 
largest groups have through mergers and buy outs achieved control over more than 40% of the 
market. The regulating regime has changes from net cost contracts based on historical concessions 
through negotiated contracts based on ”normalised costs” and ”efficiency agreements” to tendered 
contracts in some counties, so far based on full cost. During the same period the operating unit cost 
has declined by approx. 20%, the subsidy rate by approx. 1/3 from 37% to 24%, and production has 
grown slightly. To test hypothesises about factors affecting the cost level at company and county level 
we have collected accounting and production data for all the companies for the period 1986-96 
Statistics Norway. This pooled time series – cross section data set is used to estimate the effect of 
contractual form, economy of scale and scope, subsidy level on cost pr vehicle km, controlling for 
factors as passenger density, route speed and urban area. The same data and variables are applied to 
test hypothesises of market efficiency measured by cost pr passenger km. 
2Background 
W ithin the research project “Institutional and financial framework for the development of efficient 
and rational local transport”, financed by the Research Council of Norway, the Institute of Transport 
Economics has carried out 4 different analyses focusing on: 
x Restructuring of the bus transport industry (Carlquist 1998) 
x International trends compared with the Norwegian development 
x In-depth analyses of developments in 5 urban areas (Norheim and Carlquist, 1999) 
x Development trends based on local and regional bus transport statistics (this working report) 
Until the late 1960s subsidies for local public transport were very modest. In the 1970s, both the unit 
operating costs and subsidies in the bus industry increased sharply. On the other hand, fare revenues 
declined as a result of low fare policy and declined patronage following the sharp increase in 
ownership of private cars. Until 1981, the government granted subsidies on a net cost basis to 
operators operating on concessions given for an area or a single route. Up to 1986, the government 
transferred dedicated public transport subsidies to the county authorities. 
From 1986 the county authorities have been free to allocate all their resources among their main 
responsibilities for public service: health care, secondary education and transport. From 1991, the 
transportation act introduced competitive tendering, and in the spring of 1994 the amendments passed 
the parliament. The act of transportation includes a clause giving the operators the right of redemption 
if more than 20% of their production is put out on tender within 1 year, or more than 50% within 5 
years from the first tender. This clause is in action until year 2002. 
At present approx. 2-3% of the route production is operated on contracts obtained after a competitive 
procedure. Except for the capital area of Oslo and the tendered contracts, all public transport is 
operated on net-cost contracts where the county authorities approve the fares and level of service. All 
operators are private right incorporated companies. Shareholders are either private, public entities or 
both. Except one tendered contract won by the French-owned Swedish company Linjebuss, all 
operators are still domestic. 
Over the last 4-5 years, the industry has been subject to a sharp restructuring through mergers and 
acquisitions. At present, the two largest groups control 43% of the market and 37% of the buses; the 5 
largest control 77% of the market and 63% of the buses (Carlquist 1998). 
W hen the regional level (the counties) took over the full responsibility for local public transport in 
1986, it was clear for the most innovative of the county councils that there was a lack of cost control 
in the sector. A system of “normalised cost”, taking into account different types of buses, lines, and 
3areas to serve, was developed and subsequently implemented as a basis for negotiated contracts in 12 
of 19 counties in the period 1986-95 (Gaasland 1998). 
After the potential competitive pressure was established in 1991, some counties negotiated new 
contracts with the operators, stating that specific cutbacks in operating costs and subsidies were to be 
achieved each year over a period of 3-7 years. If the conditions in these “efficiency agreements” were 
not fulfilled, the service would be put out on competitive tender. 
At present, tendering is used for as little as 2-3% of the production. 3 counties have decided or have 
started to implement incentive-based quality contracts in a net cost regime (for Oslo, see Norheim’s 
paper). 
Hypotheses 
A number of hypotheses have been formulated, regarding performance in the bus industry as 
an effect of changes in the legal framework. To test these hypotheses, it is necessary to control 
for a number of background variables such as economies of scale and scope, ownership and 
other factors affecting the operating conditions. The analyses are based on available data for the 
period 1986 to 1996. 
Legal and contractual framework 
At the local level, the hypotheses formulated are: 
x The implementation of «normalised cost» contracts has contributed to significant reduction in 
operating costs. 
x The implementation of efficiency agreements has contributed to significant reductions in 
operating costs. 
At the national level, the hypotheses are: 
x The possibility for competitive tendering has put more pressure on operators to reduce cost, i.e. 
there is a shift in trend regarding operating costs from 1992. 
x The level of subsidy affects cost as a consequence of weak cost discipline, i.e. the higher the 
subsidy rate, the higher the operating costs. 
4Economies of scale, ownership and alliances 
Earlier works suggest that there are modest economies of scale in local bus operation. Several works 
indicate that the unit cost to operator curve is convex. Berechman (1993) surveyed several studies; 
Solvoll (1995) analysed Norwegian data for two different years and found similar indications.  
The following hypothesis has been tested: 
x The unit-cost to operator size relation is convex 
There has been a significant restructuring of the industry during the 1990s. The state-owned NSB 
Biltrafikk A/S (a subsidiary of the Norwegian State Railways) is one of the most important actors, and 
has acquired several companies mainly in the period 1993 to 1998.  
Our hypothesis is that companies in the NSB group thus have lower operating costs than other 
operators. 
Economies of scope 
Several companies have been involved in other transport services than licensed local public transport. 
This includes e.g. goods transport, unscheduled coach services, and lately long distance coach 
services. Such multi-service production might gain the cost efficiency since use of drivers and 
vehicles for different purposes could improve utilisation of resources. We have proposed two 
hypotheses:  
x Companies that also operate goods transport have lower costs in passenger transport than others. 
x The cost in passenger transport is lower, the smaller proportion in company passenger transport 
that is subsidised transport. 
Background variables - operating conditions 
In most productive activities there is a long-term trend towards more efficient production of goods 
and services. This should also apply to public transport services. 
Local conditions should have significant effect on the level of operating costs. Operating speed is a 
key variable since the heaviest component of cost is the drivers’ wages.  
Urban areas have at least some congestion leading to reduced operating speed. The distances 
between stops are short. This leads to higher driver costs and costs to fuel and maintenance of the 
vehicle. The larger the urban area is, the larger is the proportion of the route kilometres run during 
5rush hours. This leads to higher costs because a larger proportion of vehicles only are operated for 1-3 
hours daily, and the drivers have to be paid for a longer period than they are actually driving. 
We have divided the urban areas in three groups, in order to test whether this affects unit cost:  
1) The Oslo region: 900,000 inhabitants 
2) Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger: 150-230,000 inhabitants 
3) 7 other cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants 
Coastal areas have limited accessibility due to limited road infrastructure. The road network is 
connected with ferries, bridges or tunnels with tolls. This might increase costs indirectly through 
operating conditions or directly through the tolls that have to be paid. Our hypothesis is that 
companies that have expenses to tolls and ferries have higher costs (exclusive of tolls and ferry fees) 
than other does. 
Traffic density measured by boarding passengers per vehicle kilometre. The more 
boardings/alightings there is on a route, the higher is the cost due to vehicle maintenance, support, 
ticketing, fuel consumption etc. 
Data 
For each financial year the bus operators have to submit to the Central Bureau of Statistics a detailed 
description of their operating costs and use of labour, fuel, tyres, rolling stock etc. Number of 
passengers, passenger km, fare revenue and subsidies are also reported.  
The unit of report is company activity within a county for the years 1986-96. For the earlier years this 
is straightforward and correct. Since 1994, the mergers and acquisitions at national level have 
accelerated. Companies operating in several counties either report their activity in each county, or 
only in the county of their head office.  
We have carefully examined the database to identify outliers and inaccurate information. A number of 
records were missing variables important for an analysis of productive efficiency, to estimate a cost 
function defining the relation between unit costs of production and prices and quantities for the input 
factors. Input prices are not reported explicitly, but in principle they can be calculated by dividing the 
reported quantities by the reported cost of input. The accuracy of data for important factors of input 
appeared to be weak. Size of rolling stock is an example of a variable that we had to reject to use for 
the analysis. An attempt to estimate translog cost functions (Viton 1998, Matas and Raymond 1998) 
6with labour, fuel and capital as input factors had to be rejected because 3/5 of the observations missed 
either at least one of these factors or factor price. 
Total number of operators and remaining operators in the database after rejection resp. vehicle km is 
given in table below. 
Table 1: Description of database 
Year Operators Mill Vehicle km's 1000 vehicle 
km/operator 
 T otal U sed  %  E x cl. T otal U sed  %  E x cl. T otal U sed  S peed  C ost km 
1986 327 300 8 % 310.2 304.5 1.8 % 949 1015 18.9 100.0 
1987 289 262 9 % 318.2 311.0 2.2 % 1101 1187 19.2 98.3 
1988 311 289 7 % 319.1 318.3 0.3 % 1026 1101 19.7 95.5 
1989 243 236 3 % 318.3 311.8 2.0 % 1310 1321 19.3 93.6 
1990 235 227 3 % 313.7 313.0 0.2 % 1335 1379 20.0 93.3 
1991 203 194 4 % 310.0 302.9 2.3 % 1527 1561 20.5 92.3 
1992 209 202 3 % 312.8 300.3 4.0 % 1497 1487 21.1 88.6 
1993 205 195 5 % 327.3 313.4 4.2 % 1596 1607 21.7 86.6 
1994 189 178 6 % 337.1 318.0 5.7 % 1784 1787 21.4 85.7 
1995 166 156 6 % 320.4 296.4 7.5 % 1930 1900 21.4 82.9 
1996 163 138 15 % 324.9 281.2 13.5 % 1993 2038 21.9 82.5 
T o ta l 2540 2377 6 %   4.0 %    -17.5 
After exclusion of observations with missing or obviously incorrect variable values 2,377 
observations (operator * year) of a total of 2,540 records in the database remained. This equals 94% of 
operators * year, and 96% of total vehicle km production over the period. Average production per 
operator is doubled during the period. As the “used” columns indicate, there has been a decline in 
proportion of reliable data. 
Model estimation 
Functional form 
To capture non-linear relations among the variables, handle continuous variables that might be ”0”, 
obtain simple interpretation of parameters and a simple estimation procedure, we specified a 
combined log-linear exponential cost function by: 
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7where  Y   cost NOK/vehicle km 1996 prices 
 C   constant 
 Xi   continuos variable >0, nr i 
 Zj   continuos variable [0 , 1] nr j 
 Dk   dummy variable nr k, =1 if yes. =0 if no,  
Di, Jj, Ek,  parameters to be estimated 
Interpretation of parameters: The elasticities, the relative change in Y by a marginal increase in a 
variable, can be written: 
Description of variables 
X1 Operators’ annual production of vehicle km in passenger transport 
X2 (X1)2
X3 Time running from 1986=1 to 1996=11 
X4 Time, years after tendering allowed 1992=1 to 1996=5 
X5 Speed (Vehicle km/ paid driver hours) 
Z1 Proportion of operators’ production that is subsidised 
Z2 Proportion of operators’ revenue that is subsidies 
Z3 Boarding passengers pr vehicle km 
D1 If efficiency agreement =1, if not =0 
D2 If normalised cost =1, if not =0 
D3 If goods transport =1, if not =0 
D4 Operator is NSB or subsidiary =1, if not =0 
D5 Operator in Oslo/Akershus county =1, if not =0 
D6 Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger =1, if not =0 
D7  Operator in other city >50 000 inhabitants =1, if not =0 
D8 Expenses to ferry or toll road =1, if not =0 
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8Estimation results 
The central hypotheses relate to contractual form and impact on overall efficiency in the industry, and 
not which individual company that is most efficient. Therefore, we found Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS) estimation with operator’s production of vehicle kilometers as weights, to be the most 
appropriate method. Estimations were done by the programme package SPSS. 
The estimated parameters are reported in table 2. 
Table 2: Estimated parameters 
  LnY lnV LnP 
  Coeff. t-valu e Coeff. t-valu e Coeff. t-valu e 
C Constant 2.8864 25.067 1.6161 4.162 0.1387 2.647 
        
 1 L n(k m ) 0.2133 7.728 0.1088 1.181 -0.0446 -3.569 
 2 (L nk m )2 -0.0134 -7.297 -0.0138 -2.241 0.0028 3.364 
 3 Tim e  86-96 -0.0233 -3.309 -0.0010 -0.044 0.0102 3.211 
 4 Tim e : 92-96 -0.0196 -2.491 0.0342 1.293 0.0089 2.484 
 5 S p e e d  -0.3217 -19.371 -0.5257 -9.260 0.0154 2.022 
 1 P rop . su b sid ise d  0.0193 0.913 0.9838 12.802 -0.0441 -4.599 
 2 P rop . su b sid y  -0.1272 -6.236 -0.5009 -7.186 0.0845 9.064 
 3 B oard ing s/k m  0.1063 18.246 -0.3438 -14.794 -0.0144 -4.790 
 1 E ff. A g re e m e nt 0.0272 2.334 0.0674 1.679 -0.0031 -0.566 
 2 N orm . Cost -0.0382 -5.059 -0.0962 -3.830 0.0091 2.659 
 3 G ood s = 1 -0.0119 -1.624 0.1041 4.272 -0.0127 -3.817 
 4 N S B  = 1 -0.1050 -9.330 -0.1613 -4.272 -0.0051 -0.993 
 5 O slo +  = 1 0.1788 14.211 1.0527 23.061 0.0318 5.372 
 6 L arg e  c ity  = 1 0.0320 3.226 0.0322 0.963 0.0226 4.967 
 7 City > 50000 = 1 -0.0622 -5.190 -0.0234 -0.586 0.0156 2.878 
 8 F e rry /toll = 1 0.0262 2.811 -0.0279 -0.861 0.0002 0.039 
    0.188  0.38  0.044  
R2  0.555  0.371  0.095  
Y= Cost NOK/vehicle km 
V= Cost NOK/passenger km 
P= Profit ratio 
Of the 17 estimated parameters, 15 are significant at the 5% level given a 2-tailed t-test, while 1 (E)
is significant by a 1-tailed t-test. The R2 value of 0.555 indicates that our model explains more than 
55% of the variation in cost among operators over the years examined. This can be considered as 
satisfying, since major cost determinants at operator level are left out from the model by reasons noted 
above.  
Examination of the residuals indicates that their variance is constant and that the residuals not are 
correlated to unit cost. 
9Interpretation of results 
Background variables 
The general trend variable shows a decrease in unit cost of 6.3% over the period. “Drivers’ speed” is 
as expected an important variable, the cost elasticity is above 0.32. 
Ferries or toll roads have significant influence on unit cost. Operators operating in such conditions are 
expected to have 2.6% higher unit cost (exclusive of ferry and toll expenses) than others do. 
Urban conditions imply higher expected unit cost. Operators in Oslo and Akershus County are 
expected to have nearly 18% higher costs than companies operating under the same conditions in 
other counties. The 3 “second largest” cities, Bergen, Trondheim, and Stavanger are expected to have 
on average 3.2% higher unit costs. Operators in the smaller cities ranging from 50-150,000 
inhabitants, are expected to have 6% costs. These findings are clearly significant. The explanation for 
this might be as noted above that the proportion of extra rush hour vehicle km’s to total vehicle km’s 
is lower than in other areas. 
Passenger density, i.e. number of boarding passengers per vehicle km has significant influence on unit 
cost. J3 = 0.106 means that unit cost increase by 1% if the number of boarding passengers increases 
by 10% from 1 to 1.1 per vehicle km. The value of 1 is relatively close to the national average. 
Economies of scale 
The operator size variables (a1, a2) indicate that the unit cost increases with the number of vehicle 
km’s until approx. 2.8 mill km/year (exp(-a1/2*a2) = 2.8 mill km/year) and decreases slightly for 
larger operators. This in opposition to a number of other studies showing convex curves. Possible 
explanations for this are that we are controlling for several background variables that might be related 
to size. One that might be important in this context is the trend variable that shows high significance 
and the fact that there has been considerable company concentration during the period. However, we 
ran the same model specification separate for each year to investigate this. We found a1>0 and a2 < 0 
for every year, but the parameters were significant only for 6 of the later years. 
Earlier analyses both on Norwegian and international data indicate that there are economies of scale in 
production of bus route km’s up to a certain level (U-shaped cost curve with respect to size of 
company) (Solvoll, Jørgensen and Pedersen 1994, Matas m fl 1998, Berechman 1993, Dale-Olsen 
1996). The massive restructuring of the European bus industry both at national and at the international 
level is another indication of economy of scale. 
However, the question of economies of scale can be seen from two angles: 
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x Production: is it more efficient to operate a company with a large production than a company with 
a small production? 
x Market: is it more efficient for users to relate to few but large company units with uniform 
information, fare system, integrated network of routes etc, than small and independent 
companies? 
Carlquist (1998) anticipated two motivations for this: 
x Strategic economies of scale; benefits from competence and power with respect to negotiating 
contracts for purchase of fuel, buses, spare parts, service agreements toward the suppliers of 
material and contracts with the authorities. Another aspect of such economies of scale is know-
how with respect to information technology, administrative solutions, benchmarking, quality 
management and the transport market. 
x Market power in certain areas to maintain the market share in a situation where future competitive 
tendering is expected. 
For many counties, there has been a tendency towards only one large operator dominating in each 
county. These operators (incl. subsidiaries) have a unit cost more than 10% below the others, 
everything else being equal.  
Economy of scope 
Operators running other than subsidised passenger transport do not tend to have lower costs. The 
parameter (J1) is positive but not significantly greater than zero. Operators running both passenger 
and goods services have slightly lower operating costs in passenger transport than other operators. 
This is significant on a one-sided test, but an expectation of 1.2% lower costs, everything else equal, 
is quite low. 
Legal and contractual framework 
Efficiency agreements do not contribute to reduce costs, according to the results. On the contrary, 
operators with such agreements tend to have nearly 3% higher cost than other operators. This is 
surprising, but one explanation may be that such agreements are quite new, and that they in effect are 
chosen as instruments in counties where costs are presumed to be higher than they “should be”. Since 
this form of agreement is new, it could take a few more years before they have the planned effect. On 
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the other hand, it may be argued that these agreements are too weak to offset the general trend of 
more efficient public transport. 
The normalised cost contracts give at average nearly 4% lower cost than the other contracts do. 
Compared to the efficiency agreements the difference is 6.5%. An explanation for this might be that 
the operators’ incentives to reduce cost under the normalised cost contracts are stronger, since this can 
contribute to increased profit, whereas the efficiency agreements are normally related to reduced 
subsidies. 
The trend factor from 1992 is significantly stronger than for the whole period. This can approve the 
hypothesis that the legal opening for the counties to put the operation out to competitive tendering 
lead to increased cost discipline among the operators. 
The subsidy to cost rate is significantly negative. J2 = -0.13 has the interpretation that a 100% 
subsidised operator’s unit cost is 13% lower than that of a non-subsidised operator. The interpretation 
of this result is important for policy makers; the subsidies cover low fare revenue caused by either low 
fares or low patronage and not to cover operational losses due to high cost.
Cost per passenger km 
This analysis shows that there is no significant trend regarding reduced cost per passenger km. The 
explanation behind this is quite simple; there has been a significant decrease in patronage. This might
be a result of more focus on reducing subsidies and cost pr km in the period rather than delivering 
better quality service at a reasonable price to the users. The parameters for efficiency agreements and 
normalised cost contracts have the same signs as for cost per vehicle km, but with more weight on 
normalised cost contracts. This indicates that operators in the normalised cost contract regime at 
average have higher patronage than other operators do. 
Profitability 
Profitability has improved significantly over the period. The estimated parameters indicate that small 
and large operators tend to have higher profits than the mid-size operators do. Profitability is 
significantly higher in urban areas than in other areas. Profitability in passenger transport is 
significantly lower for operators also involved in goods transport. On the other hand, companies with 
a larger proportion of subsidised company passenger transport have higher profitability than 
companies with a lower proportion of subsidised transport. 
12 
Concluding remarks 
We have found significant indications for a trend towards reduced cost in the Norwegian bus industry 
over the period studied. This can partly be explained by the potential, but not yet actual, competitive 
pressure from the legal opening for tendering. Contractual forms have influenced cost through both 
efficiency agreements and normalised cost based contracts. Low revenue from fares, rather than high 
costs, determines the level of subsidy. 
The collection of official data for the public transport sector should be more concentrated on market 
data and less detailed on production data as the accuracy of relevant variables suffer from the mass of 
data collected with questionable quality. The production side should at least contain some information 
of the route structure such as line kilometers covered and vehicle kilometers divided by peak and off-
peak hours.  
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